THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

EXPLANATION-SEEKING AND CAUSAL ATTRIBUTIONS

by

© ANDREW R. NESDALE

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ABSTRACT

Although a number of writers have focused upon the nature of the attribution process, little attention has been directed toward specifying the conditions which initiate and influence the amount of explanation-seeking undertaken by observers. Moreover, few attempts have been made to examine both the effects on causal attributions of factors which influence explanation-seeking and the nature of the relationship between explanation-seeking and the type of attribution which is made.

Two experiments were conducted to assess several hypotheses concerning the influence of interpersonal and situational factors on observers' explanation-seeking and causal attributions. In both experiments male subjects observed a filmed interaction between two actors in which one of the actors acted negatively towards the other. The normativeness of the actor's negative behavior and the observer's liking for the actor were varied in the first experiment. Analysis of subjects' responses on a measure of amount of explanation-seeking indicated that observers searched more for an explanation when the actor was liked rather than disliked. This analysis also yielded a significant normativeness x liking interaction. Counter-normative negative behavior instigated extensive search by observers regardless of liking for the actor, whereas

normative behavior generated extensive search when the actor was liked rather than disliked. Analysis of subjects' causal attribution responses indicated only that the disliked compared with the liked actor's behavior was attributed to more dispositional causes. Finally, analysis of the confidence with which observers made their causal attributions yielded a significant normativeness x liking interaction. Whereas the confidence of observers of a disliked actor tended to decrease from counter-normative to normative conditions, the confidence of observers of a liked actor increased significantly from counter-normative to normative conditions.

In the second experiment, the actor's status and the distraction experienced by observers from a competing task were varied. The data revealed only a significant main effect for duration on the explanation-seeking measure; non-distracted subjects searched more for an explanation than did distracted subjects. Analysis of the causal attribution data indicated that the actor's behavior was attributed more to his dispositions by the non-distracted compared with the distracted subjects. In addition, distraction interacted significantly with status on this measure. Non-distracted subjects attributed the high compared with the equal status actor's behavior more to his dispositions, whereas there was little difference in attributions due to status when observers were distracted. Finally, subjects indicated greater confidence in their attributions when they were non-

distracted rather than distracted.

The results obtained in the two experiments were discussed in terms of the need for attribution theorists to specify the conditions which instigate the attribution process and the specific conditions which might serve this function. Discussion also focused on the lack of a consistent relationship between amount of search and type of causal attribution despite the findings indicating that several of the interpersonal and situational conditions influenced both variables.

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Beginning with Heider's (1958) initial conceptual analysis, a number of theorists have attempted to isolate the conditions which result in a perceiver's attributing another's behavior to dispositional or situational causes (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones & Nisbett, 1971; Kelley, 1973; Shaver, 1975). Although these attributional approaches vary in both their breadth of focus and complexity of propositional structure, one basic assumption is common to them all. This assumption is that a perceiver attributes causality as a result of his need to understand the determinants of the behavioral events with which he is confronted.

However, attribution theorists have made few attempts to specify the conditions under which a perceiver typically initiates a more or less comprehensive search for an explanation of an actor's behavior. And, scant attention has been paid to examining the effects on a perceiver's causal attributions of factors which might affect his explanation-seeking. Consequently, the purpose of the present project was to assess the effects of several factors which were expected to influence a perceiver's explanation-seeking and his causal attributions of an actor's negative behavior.

Explanation-Seeking.

The aim of each of the attribution theories (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones & Nisbett, 1971; Kelley,

1967, 1973; Shaver, 1975) has been to describe the process by which people derive an explanation for an observed behavioral event. The assumption underlying this theoretical and empirical enterprise is that people have a need to understand the determinants of the events around them so that future events can be anticipated and, when possible and desirable, controlled.

While stressing the observer's need to understand, attribution theorists have made few attempts to delineate those actions or classes of acts which influence the initiation and strength of an observer's explanation-seeking. This issue is important for at least two reasons. First, there is a need to specify the behavioral events which serve to instigate the process of inferring causality in order that the parameters of the attribution process may be established. Although a number of suggestions have been made concerning the instigation of the attribution process, none has been systematically developed and subjected to research. For example, a common view appears to be that observers pursue explanations for any and all behavioral events with which they are confronted. Thus, Shaver (1975, p.125) says that "people are not content merely to be passive observers of action...(instead)... People actively search for meaning in the social world around them". Elsewhere, the same writer appears to apply some restrictions to the types of behavior which initiate explanation-seeking. For example, Shaver (1975, p.125) also asserts that, "whether the behavior in question is that of a

nation, a group, or a single person,...if that behavior is important to us, we will try to interpret it". However, no attempt is made to define what is meant by "important" behavior. Although three other analyses also appear relevant to the present issue, none has focused directly on the conditions which might instigate the attribution process. Thus, Kelley and Thibaut (1969) have outlined a number of different sources of attribution instability which result in infcrmation dependence and information seeking. Again, Kelley (1972) has delineated a number of conditions which might tc an individual's undertaking a full-blown attribution analysis rather than relying upon his existing causal schemata. Finally, Jones and Thibaut (1958) have discussed the role of inferential sets in terms of the information selected by interactants and the inferential use to which it is put.

Secondly, focusing on the amount of search undertaken by observers should serve to shed further light on the nature of the attribution process. To date, two major conceptions cf the attribution process have been advanced. On the one hand, theorists such as Jones and Nisbett (1971) suggest that attributing the cause of behavior is a one step process in which observers tend to de-emphasise such conditions as intentionality and simply attribute the behavior to a disposition which matches the behavior. For example, an observed aggressive act is attributed to an aggressive disposition. Although the theorists are not explicit on the issue, such a position implies that causal

attributions are relatively quickly and easily accomplished. On the other hand, however, some theorists (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965) view the attribution process as a step-wise progression which commences with the observation of a behavioral event and proceeds via a number of steps to a causal attribution to dispositional or situational determinants. These steps include consideration of whether the actor had the ability to commit the act, whether he tried to act in that manner and, finally, why he committed that act. However, although the attribution process is viewed as a relatively more extensive and rational process than that proposed by Jones and Nisbett (1971), it is nevertheless considered that some behavioral events may be more easily explained than others because the information available to observers is less ambiguous (Heider, 1958). However, the situations which are less ambiguous and hence result in less explanation-seeking, have not been specified.

In view of the preceding considerations, one of the purposes of the present project was to assess the amount of explanation-seeking initiated by observers under different conditions in an attempt to determine whether causal attributions are based on little, much or varying amounts of search. Furthermore, it was intended to assess whether there is any consistent relationship between the amount of search undertaken and the type of causal attribution which is made.

A recent study by Newtson (1973) provided the initial

impetus for the project. In this study, Newtson specified at least one condition which might initiate explanation-seeking. He suggested that an actor's unexpected action, which is by definition an unpredicted action, should serve to increase explanation-seeking as the observer strives to re-establish predictability over the actor's behavior. In clarifying and expanding upon this notion, it is suggested that any observed behavior which is inconsistent with the observer's expectations concerning the behaviors which are typically asscciated with a particular situation, might be anticipated to initiate explanation-seeking. This suggestion is based on the assumption that observers, through their socializing experiences and their experience in observing and seeking explanations for behavior, develop expectations or norms about the types of behaviors which are typically asscciated with, or are normative to, particular situations. In so doing, the observers will have some understanding that such normative behaviors are more situationally determined than initiated by the individual. For example, it can reasonably be assumed that observers develop an expectation about the behaviors which are normative when it rains (i.e., seeking shelter) and an explanation of why people act in this manner (i.e., prevention from getting wet). This viewpoint is consistent with Kelley's (1967) analysis of variance model of the determinants of situational attributions. In this model, cause is attributed to the situation if many people act in the same manner on different occasions in one particular

situation.

Accordingly, it is assumed in the present viewpoint that provided the observed action is consistent with the norms for that situation, the observer has no need to actively pursue an explanation since he understands why the behavior occurred on the basis of his previous experience with the same behavior. In contrast, if the observed behavior is counter-normative or inconsistent with the observer's expectations regarding the behavior typically associated with that situation, it might be anticipated that the observer would be motivated to seek an explanation for that particular event in order to re-establish his understanding and predictability.

Although a number of studies have shown that uncertainty produces information-seeking in decision-making situations (e.g. Crawford, 1974; Driscoll & Lanzetta, 1965; Jones, Wilkinson, & Braden, 1961; Lanzetta & Driscoll, 1965; Neimark, 1961), more direct support for the present ideas has been provided in Newtson's (1973) recent study. The situational expectation which was implicated in this study related to the behaviors which are typically employed in the completion of a construction model. Thus, observers in the condition manipulating Expectedness saw an actor "deliberately and methodically assembling the model. The actor consulted the instructions, found the necessary pieces, and added them to the model, occasionally checking and re-checking" (Newtson, 1973, p.34). In contrast, in the

condition manipulating Unexpectedness, the actor turned to his right after assembling the pieces for a period of two minutes, "removed his right shoe and sock, put the sock in the shoe and placed them on the table to his left, bent down again, and rolled his left pants leg up to his knee. This was done deliberately and without change of expression,.... The actor then completed the model at the same pace as in the standard tape" (Newtson, 1973, p.35). Although there are some ambiguities in his data, Newtson found, as anticipated, that the counter-normative behavior initiated more explanation-seeking in observers than did the normative behavior.

Given that counter-normative behavior does instigate a perceiver's explanation-seeking behavior, it is possible that, following counter-normativeness, certain other conditions will increase or restrict the comprehensiveness of a perceiver's explanation-seeking and hence might influence his causal attributions. Among several conditions which might exert this additional influence on explanation - seeking are, first, the particular relationship existing between the actor and observer and secondly, those situational factors which might interfere with the perceiver's processing of available information relating to the observed behavior.

With regard to the first notion, it is assumed that just as people develop expectations about the behaviors which occur in particular situations, they also develop

expectations about the types of behaviors particular people will perform. Consistent with this assumption, Heider's (1958) balance theory suggests that we expect good acts from good people and bad acts from bad people. In this context, 'good' people are those conceived to be liked by, or who have high status compared with, the perceiver (Byrne,1961; Grossman & Wrighter, 1948; Vreeland, 1942). On this basis, it might be anticipated that if a person with favorable characteristics is observed to commit a negative action which is also counter-normative, the unexpectedness of that act would be increased beyond that of the situational unexpectedness of the behavior because of the perceived inconsistency between the nature of the act and the actor. And, with the increase in unexpectedness, the amount of explanation-seeking might be anticipated to increase. In contrast, if a person with unfavorable characteristics (e.g., disliked, or low status) is observed to commit a bad action which is also counter-normative, it might be anticipated that the unexpectedness of that act would be decreased because of the perceived consistency between the nature of the act and the actor. And, concomitantly, there would be less search for an explanation of that behavior.

In relation to the nature of the situation in which the perceiver observes the behavior, it is possible that an observer typically has an unimpaired opportunity to pursue an explanation of an observed event to his own satisfaction. Nevertheless, it is also likely that situations will arise in which conditions which are peculiar to the situation

might interfere with and reduce the perceiver's processing of available information concerning the possible cause of the counter-normative behavior. For example, it might be anticipated that explanation-seeking following the observation of counter-normative behavior, would be reduced if the perceiver is required to undertake another concurrent task(s) or if the perceiver is otherwise severely restricted in the time he can devote to reaching an explanation which is satisfactory to him (e.g., if the actor's behavior necessitates an immediate response by the perceiver).

The present project was designed to examine some of these ideas. Specifically, an attempt was made to evaluate the proposition that explanation-seeking, which is initiated by counter-normative behavior, is increased or decreased by factors which influence the unexpectedness of that behavior, and restricted by factors which interfere with the perceiver's processing of available information.

Causal Attributions

The present project was also directed toward examining the effects on the perceiver's causal attributions of factors which affect his explanation-seeking. Although this issue has received little attention from researchers, Newtson (1973) has proposed that an actor's unexpected or counter-normative action leads an observer to interpret that behavior as being caused more by dispositions than by situational events. This proposition was based on the

assumption that the perceiver's increased focusing of attention on the actor following his counter-normative behavior provides greater information concerning the actor rather than the situation.

Although a number of researchers have found that perceivers attribute an actor's counter- normative behavior to his dispositions (Jones, Davis & Gergen, 1961; Jones et al., 1971), their predictions have been based upon Jones and Davis' (1965) theory of correspondent inferences rather than upon Newtson's (1973) suggestion that dispositional attributions result from increased focusing by observers. Thus, the former researchers have predicted that a perceiver attributes an actor's counter-normative behavior to a disposition which matches the behavior (i.e., a correspondent inference) simply because most people are not expected to act in a way which is inconsistent with socially accepted forms of behavior. These investigators have assumed that the perceivers would feel that the counter-normative behavior must have been caused by the actor's unique dispositions. However, the consistent finding that an actor's counter-normative behavior is attributed to his dispositions has been obtained in situations where virtually the only information available to the perceiver has been the counter-normative behavior. The typical paradigm has effectively reduced the likelihood of the behavior being attributed to other causes such as a second person's instigation or the actor's temporary mood. For example, perceivers have rarely observed an actor interacting in a

dyad. And, the effects on attributions of such potentially influential variables as the liking or status relationship between the actor and observer has received little attention from researchers. Moreover, the possibility of such factors as the liking relationship between actor and observer exerting an influence on attributions is not encompassed by Jones and Davis' (1965) theory.

Accordingly, the second proposition which was evaluated in the present project was that factors which affect the comprehensiveness of the perceiver's explanation-seeking also directly influence the perceiver's causal attributions. It was assumed that, first, a perceiver may attribute an actor's behavior to his dispositions or to the particular situation. Secondly, it was assumed that the simplest or easiest explanation is one in which the action is attributed to a corresponding disposition (e.g., attributing an aggressive act to an aggressive disposition).

Based on these assumptions, it was anticipated that after observing a counter-normative action, perceivers attribute the behavior to a corresponding disposition when they are not motivated by other factors (e.g., liking for the actor) to make a comprehensive explanation search, or when other factors (e.g., distracting tasks) interfere with this explanation-seeking. Alternatively, if a perceiver is motivated by factors such as liking for the actor to undertake a more comprehensive search following the actor's counter-normative negative behavior, it was anticipated that

the behavior is attributed more to the situation than to the actor's disposition. This expectation was based on the assumption that those factors which are likely to increase explanation-seeking because they increase unexpectedness (e.g., the perceiver's liking for an actor who commits a counter- normative negative action) lead the perceiver to go beyond a simple correspondent inference in his search for an acceptable explanation. In attributing the negative act of a liked or high status person to the situation (e.g., to another's instigation or to the actor's temporary bad mood), the perceiver's general expectation that 'good people do good acts' is not compromised.

A number of studies (e.g., Regan, Strauss and Fazio, 1973; Thibaut and Riecken, 1955;Manes & Fitzgerald, Note 1) have provided data consistent with these ideas although their focus has not been on factors which affect both explanation-seeking and causal attributions. And, observers in these studies have been asked primarily to attribute an actor's commission or omission of a positive act rather than his commission of a negative act. For example, Regan, Strauss and Fazio (1974) conducted two experiments in which observers were asked to attribute either the helping behavior, or the good or poor performance, of a liked or disliked actor to dispositional or situational factors. It was found that the behavior which was consistent with affect for the actor (e.g., good actions by liked actors) was attributed to dispositions while behavior which was inconsistent with affect was attributed to the situation.

Similarly, Thibaut and Riecken (1955) found that the positive act of a high status person was attributed to his dispositions while the same act by a low status person was attributed to external causes. Finally, Manes and Fitzgerald (Note 1) replicated Thibaut and Reicken's finding and also found that the failure to commit a positive act by a high status person was attributed to external causes while the same act by a low status person was attributed to his dispositions.

Although these studies have shed some light upon the influence of liking and status on causal attributions, the present project was directed toward examining the influence of these factors and those which interfere with processing on both a perceiver's explanation-seeking and causal attributions of another's negative behavior. In order to do this, two experiments were conducted. The first experiment varied liking for the actor and the normativeness of his behavior, while the second varied the actor's status and the distraction experienced by the observer as he viewed the actor's behavior.

The aim of the initial experiment was , first, to examine the effect of normativeness of behavior on explanation-seeking and causal attributions. And, second, an attempt was made to assess the influence of factors which might increase or decrease the unexpectedness of the actor's behavior on the perceiver's explanation-seeking and causal attributions. In this experiment, perceivers observed

normative or counter -normative negative behavior by a liked or disliked actor. In accordance with Newtson's (1973) findings, it was expected that explanation-seeking would increase following counter-normative behavior compared with normative behavior. Furthermore, it was anticipated that a perceiver would attribute the actor's counter-normative compared with his normative behavior more to his dispositions simply because the former behavior would not be expected from most people. That is, the behavior will be seen as unique to the actor.

When the counter-normative negative behavior is committed by a liked compared with a disliked person, it was anticipated that the inconsistency between the liked person committing a negative act causes the perceiver to see his behavior as more unexpected than the same action by a disliked person. Consequently, the perceiver searches less for an explanation of the disliked person's counter-normative negative act and accepts the first and simplest explanation; that is, that the negative act was the result of a negative disposition. In contrast,the perceiver's affect for the liked actor would lead him to increase his search and to go beyond the dispositional attribution by interpreting the act as being due more to the situation (e.g. "he was instigated by the other", or "he was in a temporary bad mood").

In summary, the following hypotheses were advanced and tested in the first experiment:

1a. A perceiver's explanation-seeking is greater following another's counter- normative rather than his normative behavior.

1b. Compared with an actor's normative behavior, an actor's counter-normative behavior is attributed more to his dispositions than to the situation.

2a. A perceiver's explanation-seeking is greater following a liked compared with a disliked person's counter-normative negative action.

2b. A liked person's counter-normative negative act is attributed more to the situation whereas the same act by a disliked person is attributed more to his dispositions.

The second experiment was undertaken with two aims; first, to assess further the effect on the perceiver's explanation-seeking and causal attributions of factors which might increase the unexpectedness of the actor's behavior; and second, to examine the perceiver's explanation-seeking and causal attributions when situational factors interfere with the perceiver's explanation-seeking.

Accordingly, perceivers observed a counter-normative negative action by a higher or equal status actor, under conditions of distraction or non-distraction. Because a counter-normative negative act by a high status compared with an equal status person is likely to enhance the unexpectedness of the former's action, it was anticipated that a perceiver's explanation-seeking following the higher

status person's negative act would be greater than that following the same action by an equal status person. Again, whereas it would be plausible for the perceiver to simply attribute the equal status person's act to a negative disposition, it was considered that he would go beyond this attribution in inferring the cause of the high status person's act because a negative disposition would not be seen to fit the latter. It was anticipated that the high status person's act would be attributed more to the situation than to his dispositions.

When a perceiver observes another's counter-normative action and is also required to undertake a distracting task, it was anticipated that the interference from the distracting task would reduce his explanation-seeking more than that of a perceiver under non-distraction conditions. Because the only information available to the observer is the actor's counter-normative behavior, it was anticipated that in both non-distraction and distraction conditions, the actor's behavior would be attributed to his dispositions simply because most people do not act that way. However, in view of the reduced search under distraction conditions, it was anticipated that the actor's behavior would be attributed more to dispositional causes under distraction than non-distraction conditions.

With regard to the interaction of status and distraction, it was anticipated that under distraction conditions the interference from the distracting task would

reduce the perceiver's explanation-seeking and lead him to attribute the counter-normative act to the actor's dispositions, regardless of the actor's status. In contrast, it was hypothesised that the non-distracted perceiver would attribute the high status person's action more to the situation whereas the equal status person's act would be attributed more to his dispositions. That is, it was anticipated that the differences in both explanation-seeking and causal attributions due to distraction would be greater when the actor has higher rather than equal status.

In summary, the following hypotheses were advanced and tested in the second experiment:

1a. A perceiver's explanation-seeking is greater following a high compared with an equal status person's counter-normative negative action.

1b. A high status person's counter-normative negative action is attributed more to the situation than his dispositions, compared with the same act by an equal status person.

2a. A perceiver's explanation-seeking following another's counter-normative negative behavior is greater under non-distraction than distraction conditions.

2b. An actor's counter-normative negative behavior is attributed more to his dispositions than the situation under both distraction and non-distraction conditions, but the behavior is attributed more to dispositional causes under distraction conditions.

3a. Following an actor's counter-normative negative

behavior, the differences in a perceiver's explanation-seeking due to distraction are greater when the actor has higher rather than equal status.

3b. Following an actor's counter-normative negative behavior, the differences in a perceiver's causal attributions due to distraction are greater when the actor has higher rather than equal status. That is, an equal status person's counter-normative action under both distraction and non-distraction conditions is attributed more to his dispositions. In contrast, a high status person's counter-normative action under distraction conditions is attributed more to his dispositions whereas the same person's action under non-distraction is attributed more to the situation.

EXPERIMENT 1

Method

Subjects and Design

A total of 46 male undergraduate students at the University of Alberta participated in the experiment as part of an introductory psychology course requirement.

A 2 x 2 factorial analysis of variance design was used with two levels of normativeness and two levels of liking. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions.

Apparatus and Materials

A video tape recorder was used to present the actor's behavior. Subjects viewed the taped sequence on a 23" TV monitor. The behavior sample consisted of a visual display only; no sound was provided.

Two tapes, each showing an interaction sequence between two people, were prepared. The first tape, a soundless practice film, was a 3 minute clip which depicted one person entering a room and greeting a second person who was sitting reading. The two then engaged in conversation before the first person stood and left the room. The second (experimental) tape was a 5 minute interaction sequence and depicted two different people (the actor and a second person) seated and facing each other at a table. The tape

commenced with an experimenter apparently introducing the task to the two people who then each read a set of instructions. The two people then commenced a model construction task, each moving quickly to supply pieces of the model and each consulting the model diagram at frequent intervals. As each minute elapsed, it was indicated by 1, 2, 3, or 4 bells. Shortly after the second minute elapsed, the actor stopped, grabbed a piece of the model from the second person and then very obviously berated him for a period of ten seconds. The two people then continued the task for a further 3 minutes.

Procedure

The subject was seated at a table facing a TV monitor which was 10 feet distant. The subject was told that the experiment was one of a series being conducted on the effects of different media (e.g. TV., radio) on an observer's impressions (Appendix 1 contains the complete instructions). The subject was informed that the aim of this particular experiment was to compare the impressions formed by different people from a normal TV film (i.e., picture and sound) with those based only on the picture (i.e., no sound). The subject was told that he was to view three films, the first two of which were intended to give him practice in the impression formation task. In fact, the second film was the main experimental film and subjects were led to believe there were three films so that they would not be particularly oriented towards the second (experimental) film.

The experimenter then explained that the first practice film would present an informal interaction sequence between two graduate students which the experimenter had made for the purposes of the present experiment. In contrast, subjects were told that the remaining two films were clips taken from films made of real experiments. After consulting a list, the experimenter told the subject that he was to view the soundless films.

Before viewing the first film, the subject was informed that all subjects were required to fill in a standard attitude scale (Appendix 2) in order to provide extra information which could then be related to the type of impressions he formed from the films. After completing this task, the subject viewed the first film and gave his impressions of the "general atmosphere" in the filmed interaction sequence in a brief questionnaire (Appendix 3). While the subject was undertaking this task the experimenter apparently 'scored' the subject's attitude scale.

After ensuring that the subject felt comfortable with the impression formation task, the experimenter introduced the second (experimental) film. The subject was told that the film depicted an experiment which was one of a series which had been conducted on competitive behavior. He was informed that the two participants in the experiment were required to complete a model-building task in which the person who contributed most to the completion of the task in a 5 minute period was judged the winner.

The experimenter then carried out the liking manipulation which was accomplished by manipulating attitude similarity (McGuire, 1969). While turning to switch on the tape, the experimenter noted that the subject might find the tape interesting because, in terms of his responses on the attitude scale he was very similar (Like condition) or different (Dislike condition) to one of the participants in the filmed experiment. The experimenter added that the subject and the similar (or different) participant would probably "get on very well together" (or, " not get on very well together at all"). The tape was then turned on and the experimenter identified the similar (or dissimilar) participant to the subject. After a pause, and just when the competitors started the task, the experimenter advised that the subject would see only the first couple of minutes of the film before going on to the main experimental film.

The experimenter then established the normativeness manipulation. For subjects in the Normative condition, the experimenter noted that "the task was apparently quite arousing and tended to bring out the competitiveness in the subjects who participated". The subject was told that he would see an example of this in the film in that the similar (or, dissimilar) person grabbed a stick from the other person shortly after two minutes had elapsed and that an argument ensued. Thus, the Normative condition was designed to establish in subjects the norm that this type of competitive behavior was fairly common in this situation and

that it resulted from the nature of the task acting upon the subjects. In contrast, subjects in the Counter-normative condition were told nothing about the behavior they were about to observe. As a result, the argument sequence occurred suddenly to them and was counter-normative to them both in terms of their expectations regarding the way in which two people would compete on an experimental task like this and their expectations developed on the basis of the first two minutes of film.

The experimenter terminated the tape 20 seconds after the argument sequence concluded. The subject then completed the main questionnaire (Appendix 4) which contained manipulation check items, the main dependent measures, and filler items. The experimenter then noted that there were about three minutes of the film remaining and asked the subject how many more of the remaining three minutes of the film he would like to see in order to feel fully confident in his attribution response.

The subject was then told that he would not see a third film and that the experiment was concluded. In order to check for suspiciousness, the subject was then asked what he thought the experiment was about, whether he thought the second film was of a real experiment and whether he did feel similar (or, dissimilar) to the filmed competitor on the basis of his responses on the attitude scale. The subject was then fully debriefed concerning the real purpose of the experiment and thanked for his participation.

Dependent Measures

With the exception of one explanation-seeking measure, the measures to check the manipulations and main dependent measures were contained in the main questionnaire (Appendix 4). These measures were primarily in the form of bi-polar 7-point scales.

Manipulation Check Items

Liking. The subject's liking for the actor was checked using two measures. First, as one item of a 7-item impression scale, subjects were asked to rate the likeability of the actor on a scale ranging from likeable - unlikeable. Secondly, the subjects' ratings on the remaining 6 items of the impression scale (reliable - unreliable, wavering- persistent, honest - dishonest, irritable - good-natured, humorous - humorless, tolerant - finicky) were summed to give an overall favorability rating. In view of the procedure employed in the liking manipulation, subjects were also asked to indicate how similar (very similar - not similar at all) they felt themselves to be to the actor.

Normativeness. The normativeness of the actor's behavior was checked by asking subjects to rate on a 7-point bi-polar scale, how unexpected to them was the argument between the two competitors (very unexpected - not unexpected at all).

Main Dependent Measures

Explanation-seeking. Three measures were used to assess the subject's explanation-seeking following his observation of the argument sequence. First, subjects were asked to indicate the extent to which they found themselves searching for an explanation of the actor's argumentative behavior (no search at all - great deal of search). Secondly, subjects were asked to recall the next three specific movements made by the actor immediately after the argument sequence. The inclusion of this measure was based on Newtson's (1973) suggestion that the observation of unexpected behavior should result in an increased focusing of attention on the actor's behavior. Thirdly, after completing the main questionnaire, subjects were asked to indicate how many more of the remaining three minutes of the film they would need to see in order to become fully confident in their attributions. This number was recorded.

Causal Attributions. The subjects' causal attributions of the actor's argumentative behavior were assessed by way of their ratings on a scale (A's own characteristics - Characteristics of situation) of how much the argument was caused by the actor's own characteristics (i.e., his personality traits or dispositions) or the characteristics of the situation (i.e., the competitive nature of the task or the other person's behavior).

Finally, the subjects were also asked to indicate how

confident (very confident - not confident at all) they felt in their attribution of the actor's behavior. This measure was included in view of Newtson's (1973) suggestion that the increase in information resulting from an observer's increased focusing on an actor's behavior would make an actor feel more confident in his attributions.

Results

Data Analysis

Of the 46 subjects who participated in the experiment, the responses of 6 subjects were excluded from the analysis. Three subjects were excluded because of suspiciousness of the purpose or procedures employed in the experiment, 1 because he didn't see the argument sequence, and the remaining 2 subjects were randomly excluded from two conditions so that number of subjects per condition would be equalized at 10.

The responses of 40 subjects on each of the dependent measures were analyzed in a 2 x 2 factorial analysis of variance with subjects assigned between two normativeness conditions and two liking conditions. Subjects responses on the bi-polar scales were scored from 1 - 7.

Manipulation Check Data

Liking. The effectiveness of the liking manipulation was checked by having subjects rate the actor's likeability and by summing subjects' favorability ratings of the actor on six other dimensions. Since the actor's likeability was

manipulated primarily by perceived similarity with the subject, the subjects were also asked to indicate the extent to which they felt themselves to be similar to the actor. Analysis of subjects' responses on the similarity measure (Appendix 5) indicated only a significant main effect for liking ($F=9.99$, df 1/36, $p<.01$). Subjects in the Like condition ($\underline{M}=4.35$) indicated that they felt themselves to be more similar to the actor than did subjects in the Dislike condition ($\underline{M}=2.95$).

Consistent with these data, analysis of responses on the likeability measure (Appendix 6) also yielded only a significant main effect for liking ($F=10.80$, df 1/36, $p<.01$). Subjects in the Like condition ($\underline{M}=3.85$) perceived the actor as more likeable than did subjects in the Dislike condition ($\underline{M}=2.70$).

Finally, analysis of the subjects' summed favorability ratings (Appendix 7) on six other scales (reliable - unreliable, wavering - persistent, honest - dishonest, irritable - good-natured, humorous - humorless, tolerant - finicky) also revealed only a significant main effect for liking ($F=6.49$, df 1/36, $p<.05$). Subjects in the Like condition ($\underline{M}=22.55$) perceived the actor as more favorable than did subjects in the Dislike condition ($\underline{M}=18.90$).

Normativeness. The effectiveness of the normativeness manipulation was checked by asking subjects to indicate on a bi-polar scale how unexpected to them was the argument between the two competitors in the film. Analysis of these

data (Appendix 8) yielded only a significant main effect for normativeness (F=61.55, df 1/36, p<.01). Subjects in the Counter-normative condition ($\underline{M}$ =5.1) indicated that the argument was more unexpected than did subjects in the Normative condition ($\underline{M}$ =1.5).

Major Findings

Explanation-seeking. Three measures were employed to assess subjects' explanation-seeking following the argument sequence. First, subjects were asked to rate the extent to which they found themselves searching for an explanation of the actor's argumentative behavior. Analysis of these data (Appendix 9) yielded two significant effects; first, a significant main effect for liking was obtained (F=4.54, df 1/36, p<.05). Like condition subjects ($\underline{M}$ =5.3) indicated that they searched more for an explanation than did subjects in the Dislike condition ($\underline{M}$ =4.1).

A significant interaction between liking and normativeness was also obtained on this measure (F=5.33, df 1/36, p<.05). As indicated in Table 1, the difference in search between subjects in Like and Dislike conditions was greater when the actor's behavior was Normative rather than Counter-normative. Duncan's Multiple Range Test revealed that the search undertaken by Dislike condition subjects following the actor's Normative behavior was significantly less than the search undertaken by subjects in each of the other three conditions (p<.05). No other differences in this analysis were significant.

Table 1

Mean Search Responses

Given in Normativeness x Liking Conditions.

Normativeness	Liking	
	Liked	Disliked
Normative	5.60	3.10
Counter-Normative	5.00	5.10

Explanation-seeking was also assessed by asking subjects to recall the next three specific movements made by the actor following the argument. And, subjects were asked to indicate how many of the remaining three minutes of the film they would want to see in order to become fully confident in their attribution response. However, analyses of these data yielded no significant effects.

Causal Attributions. Judgments of the cause of the actor's behavior were assessed by asking subjects to indicate how much the argument was caused by the actor's own characteristics or the characteristics of the situation. Analysis of these data (Appendix 10) yielded a significant main effect for liking ($F=14.05$, df 1/36, $p<.01$). Subjects in the Dislike condition ($\underline{M}$ =5.15) indicated that the actor's behavior was caused more by his dispositions than did subjects in the Like condition ($\underline{M}$ =3.75). None of the other effects in this analysis was significant.

Confidence. Subjects were also asked to indicate how confident they felt in making their causal attribution. Analysis of these data (Appendix 11) yielded two significant effects; first, a significant main effect for liking was obtained ($F=4.76$, df 1/36, $p<.05$). Subjects in the Dislike condition ($\underline{M}$ =5.20) were more confident in their judgment than were subjects in the Like condition ($\underline{M}$ =4.15).

A significant interaction between liking and normativeness was also obtained on this measure ($F=5.71$, df

Table 2

Mean Confidence Ratings

Given in Normativeness x Liking Conditions

Normativeness	Liking	
	Liked	Disliked
Normative	4.90	4.80
Counter-Normative	3.40	5.60

1/36, $p<.05$). As indicated in Table 2, the difference in confidence between subjects in Like and Dislike conditions was greater when the actor's behavior was Counter-normative rather than normative. Duncan's Multiple Range Test revealed that subjects in the Like condition who observed the Counter-normative behavior were significantly less confident than subjects in each of the other three conditions ($p<.05$). None of the other differences was significant.

Discussion

The results of the first study indicated that the actor's counter-normative compared with his normative behavior did not increase the subjects' explanation-seeking as was anticipated. Instead, it was found that the normativeness of the actor's behavior influenced the perceiver's explanation-seeking only in interaction with the perceiver's liking for the actor. When the actor's behavior was normative, perceivers searched more for an explanation when the actor was liked rather than disliked, but when the actor's behavior was counter-normative, there was little difference in amount of search due to liking. Moreover, although a liking main effect on explanation-seeking was obtained, the liking x normativeness interaction did not confirm the hypothesised increase in explanation-seeking following a liked compared with disliked person's counter-normative negative behavior.

The liking x normativeness interaction serves to qualify Newtscn's (1973) finding of greater explanation-seeking following observed counter-normative rather than normative behavior. The result indicates that although counter-normative behavior instigates explanation-seeking regardless of liking for the actor, normative behavior generates less search than counter-normative behavior only when the normative behavior is committed by a disliked person. It is noteworthy that although the finding that liking influenced search under normative conditions was not predicted in the present study, it is nevertheless consistent with the framework upon which the present predictions were based. That is, the finding indicates that even when the observed behavior is typically associated with the situation, explanation-seeking may be initiated by violations of observers' expectations concerning the behaviors which are typically associated with individuals. Moreover, in the absence of data on the effect of the manipulated variables on the perceived unexpectedness of the actor's behavior, the latter result also provides some basis for explaining the lack of difference in explanation-seeking due to liking when counter-normative behavior is observed. That is, although it is possible that, contrary to the assumption upon which the hypothesis was based, the counter-normative behavior by the liked person was simply not seen as more unexpected than the same behavior by the disliked person, an alternative and more likely suggestion may be entertained. Specifically, it is possible that the counter-

normative behavior might have been so unexpected that differences due to liking were obliterated as the perceiver merely sought to find some explanation for the observed behavior. The finding that greater search was generated under normative conditions by the liked rather than disliked actor's behavior is consistent with this suggestion. It indicates that even though the negative behavior was expected in this situation and the perceiver was given some explanation as to why it occurred, the liked person's normative behavior was still perceived as unexpected and hence resulted in more search than did the disliked person's behavior.

Although liking for the actor did not interact with the normativeness of his behavior to influence explanation-seeking as expected, the first study yielded an anticipated effect of liking on the perceivers' causal attributions. Regardless of the normativeness of the observed behavior, the disliked compared with the liked person's action was attributed more to his dispositions than to the situation. This finding is consistent with Regan, Strauss and Fazio's (1973) suggestion that an actor's behavior is attributed in a way consistent with affect for the actor; that is, actions which are consistent with liking for the actor are attributed internally, whereas actions which are inconsistent with liking are attributed externally.

It is to be noted, however, that subjects did not completely discharge the liked actor's causal responsibility

for his negative action by simply attributing it to purely situational causes. Two explanations may be suggested to account for this finding. First, it is possible that the finding simply reflects a weak liking relationship between the actor and the observer. Secondly, however, when viewed in conjunction with Regan, Strauss and Fazio's (1973) results, this finding suggests that the impact of affect for an actor on an observer's attributions might be differentially influenced by the positive or negative nature of the observed action. That is, while a liked or disliked actor's positive actions may be attributed in accordance with affect for the actor (Regan, et al, 1973), it is possible that affect exerts less of an impact on attributions when the actor commits a negative action. The implication of this suggestion is that people may consider that negative actions are more indicative of dispositional influences than are positive actions (cf. Jones & Davis, 1965). Thus, while an observer might be motivated to externalize the cause of negative behavior by a liked actor in order tc maintain his level of affect or reduce inconsistency, the observer might be hesitant to make such a judgment in view of the potential significance of the negative behavior. As a result, the observer might temporize or compromise (temporarily, at least) by attributing the liked person's negative behavior to a combination of dispositional and situational causes.

Some support for this suggestion is provided in the subjects' ratings of the confidence with which they made

their attribution judgments. Subjects who observed the negative action of a liked actor were less confident in their attributions than were subjects who observed a disliked person. Moreover, analysis of the confidence data also indicated that liking for the actor interacted with the normativeness of his behavior to influence subjects' confidence ratings. Whereas the confidence of subjects who observed the behavior of a disliked actor tended to decrease from counter-normative to normative conditions, the confidence of observers of a liked actor increased significantly from counter-normative to normative conditions. Together with their attribution judgments, this finding suggests that whereas observers of liked actors had little confidence in their attribution of the actor's behavior to a combination of dispositional and situational causes when they had no prior information about the actor's behavior (i.e. Counter-normative condition), their confidence in this attribution increased significantly when they were essentially told that such behavior was due to this combination of causes and was relatively common (i.e. Normative condition). In contrast, observers of a disliked actor felt quite confident in attributing his behavior to dispositional causes under counter-normative conditions, but their confidence in this attribution tended to fall under conditions where they were told that the behavior was due to a combination of dispositional and situational causes (i.e. Normative condition) . In effect, observers' attributions may be influenced by affect for the actor but the extent of

this influence and the confidence with which the attribution is made may also depend upon the positive or negative nature of the observed behavior.

EXPERIMENT 2

Method

Subjects and Design

A total of 43 male undergraduate students at the University of Alberta participated in the experiment as part of an introductory psychology course requirement

A 2 x 2 factorial analysis of variance design was implemented with two levels of status and two levels of distraction. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions.

Apparatus and Materials

An electronic timer controlling the rate and duration of illumination of a red signal light was used in addition to the same apparatus and materials that were employed in the first experiment. The red signal light was located 2 feet below the TV monitor and was controlled by the experimenter who was seated outside of the subject's line of vision.

Procedure

As in the first experiment, each subject was told that the experiment was concerned with comparing the effects of normal and scundless TV films on observer's impressions. He was told that he would see three films and that the first two films were practice films (see Appendix 12 for complete

instructions). The subject then viewed the first film and gave his general impressions (Appendix 3) of the atmosphere in the filmed interaction sequence between the two graduate students.

The experimenter then introduced the second (experimental) film in much the same terms as were used in the first experiment. The subject was told that he would observe a film of an experiment in which two participants competed to complete a model in a five minute period. The status manipulation was implemented by the experimenter noting that, in the film the subject was to observe, the participants were a professor and a student (High status condition) or two students like the present subject (Equal status condition).

The experimenter then established the distraction manipulation. Subjects in the Distraction condition were told that, in addition to viewing the film, they would be required to mcnitor and indicate the changes in the duration of illumination of the signal light located below the TV monitor. The subject was told that the aim of this additional task was simply to assess the effect of a distracting event on an observer's impressions. Subjects in the Distraction condition were then given practice in recognising the change in the rate of illumination of the light. Subjects in the No-distraction condition were not required to undertake this additional task.

The experimenter then turned on the tape and identified

the 'professor' to subjects in the High status condition. All subjects effectively saw the counter-normative version of the film since they were not told anything about what they would see in the film. As the filmed participants commenced the model-building task, the signal light was switched on for subjects in the Distraction condition. The rate of illumination of the light was held constant at 24 illuminations per minute, but the duration of illumination was varied between .3 and .6 seconds by the experimenter. Each Distracted subject received in random order, 18 of the 24 illuminations per minute at the fast duration, and the remaining 6 illuminations at the slow duration. On each occasion that the illumination changed from a short to a long duration, subjects in the Distraction condition were required to say, "change".

As in the first experiment, the experimenter terminated the tape 20 seconds after the argument sequence concluded. The subject then completed the main questionnaire (Appendix 13) which contained manipulation check items, the main dependent measures, and filler items.

The subject was then told that he would not see a third film and that the experiment was concluded. The experimenter then checked for suspiciousness as in the first experiment before fully debriefing the subject on the real purpose of the experiment.

Dependent Measures

As in the first experiment, the measures to check the

manipulations and the main dependent measures were contained in the main questionnaire and, with the exception of one explanation-seeking measure, were in the form of bi-polar 7-point scales.

Manipulation Check Data

Status. The status manipulation was checked by summing subjects' ratings of the actor on 3 bi-polar scales of a 10 item scale. These scales referred to the actor's trustworthiness (trustworthy - untrustworthy), knowledgability (knowledgable - unknowledgable) and intelligence (intelligent - unintelligent), characteristics which are typically used to measure status (McGuire, 1969).

Based on the assumption that higher status people would be perceived more favorably than lower status people, subjects were also asked to rate the actor's likeability (likeable - unlikeable) and to give their impression of the actor on 6 other favorability scales in the 10 item scale (reliable - unreliable, wavering - persistent, honest - dishonest, irritable - good-natured, humorous - humorless, tolerant - finicky).

Distraction. The distraction manipulation was checked by asking subjects in the Distraction condition to rate the extent to which they were distracted from observing the film by the 'changing light' task (very distracted - not distracted at all).

Main Dependent Measures

Explanation-seeking. Two measures were used to assess the subjects' explanation- seeking following the argument sequence. As in the first experiment, subjects were asked to indicate on a scale the extent to which they found themselves searching for an explanation of the actor's argumentative behavior. And, second, they were asked to recall the next three specific movements made by the actor after the argument.

Causal Attributions. As in the first experiment, subjects were asked to indicate on a bi-polar scale how much the argument was caused by the actor's own characteristics or the nature of the situation. Finally, subjects were asked to indicate how confident they felt in their attribution of the actor's behavior.

Results

Data Analysis

Of the 43 subjects who participated in the experiment, the responses of 3 subjects were excluded from the analysis due to their suspicions concerning the purpose or procedures employed in the study.

The responses of the remaining 40 subjects (10 per cell) on each of the dependent measures were analyzed in a 2 x 2 factorial analysis of variance with subjects assigned

between two status conditions and two distraction conditions.

Manipulation Check Data

Status. The effectiveness of the status manipulation was checked using three measures. First, subjects rated the actor's trustworthiness, knowledgability, and intelligence and their responses on these three scales were summed. Analysis of these data (Appendix 14) yielded only a significant main effect for status ($F=7.57$, df 1/36, $p<.01$). Subjects in the High status condition($\underline{M}$ =16.05) perceived the actor as higher in status than did subjects in the Equal status condition ($\underline{M}$ =13.90).

Assuming that higher status people would be perceived more favorably than lower status people, subjects were also asked to rate the actor's likeability and to give their impression of the actor on six other favorability items in a ten-item scale. Analysis of the likeability data (Appendix 15) yielded only a significant main effect for distraction ($F=23.04$, df 1/36, $p<.01$). Distracted subjects ($\underline{M}$ =4.90) perceived the actor as more likeable than did Non-distracted subjects ($\underline{M}$ =3.00). Similarly, analysis of subjects' summed responses on the six favorability items (Appendix 16) yielded only a significant main effect for distraction ($F=17.79$, df1/36, $p<.01$). Distracted subjects ($\underline{M}$ =32.05) judged the actor more favorably than did Non-distracted subjects ($\underline{M}$ =24.60).

Distraction. The distraction manipulation was checked

by asking subjects in the Distraction condition the extent to which they were distracted from observing the film by the 'changing light' task. On a 7-point scale ranging from "very distracted" (scale value=7) to "not distracted at all" (scale value=1), the mean response was 5.65 (s.d.=1.31).

Finally, in order to check that the actor's behavior was perceived as counter-normative, an additional sample of 20 undistracted subjects rated the unexpectedness of the argument sequence on a scale ranging from "very unexpected" (scale value=7) to "not unexpected at all" (scale value=1). Subjects' mean rating of 5.35 (s.d.=1.67) indicated that the behavior was perceived as counter-normative.

Major Findings

Explanation-seeking. Two measures were employed to assess subjects' explanation seeking following the argument sequence. As in the first experiment, subjects were asked to rate the extent to which they found themselves searching for an explanation of the actor's argumentative behavior. Analysis of these data (Appendix 17) yielded only a significant main effect for distraction ($F=17.61$, df 1/36, $p<.01$); Non-distracted subjects ($\underline{M}=4.75$) searched more for an explanation than did Distracted subjects ($\underline{M}=2.85$).

A similar pattern of findings was obtained on the second explanation-seeking measure which required subjects to list the next three specific movements made by the actor following the argument sequence. Analysis of these data (Appendix 18) yielded only a significant main effect for

distraction (F=10.14, df 1/36, p<.01); Non-distracted subjects (M =1.00) recalled more of the actor's movements than did Distracted subjects (M =.30). This latter finding, of course, serves to further substantiate the effectiveness of the distraction manipulation.

Causal Attributions. Analysis of subjects' judgments of the cause of the actor's behavior (Appendix 19) revealed two significant effects. First, a significant main effect for distraction was obtained (F=12.35, df 1/36, p<.01); Non-distracted subjects (M =5.45) indicated that the actor's behavior was due more to his dispositions than did Distracted subjects (M =3.85). A significant interaction between distraction and status was also obtained on this measure (F=4.82, df 1/36, p<.05). As indicated in Table 3, the difference in attributions was greater when subjects observed the High and Equal status actor under Non-distraction rather than distraction conditions. Duncan's Multiple Range Test revealed that the attribution of the High status actor's behavior by Non-distracted subjects was significantly more dispositional than were the judgments of subjects in each of the other three conditions (p<.05). None of the other differences in this analysis was significant.

Confidence. Analysis of subjects' ratings of the confidence with which they made their causal judgments (Appendix 20) yielded only a significant main effect for distraction (F=22.75, df 1/36, p<.01). Non-distracted

Table 3

Mean Causal Attribution Judgments

Given in Distraction x Status Conditions

Distraction	Status	
	High	Equal
Distracted	3.70	4.00
Non-Distracted	6.30	4.60

Subjects ($\underline{M}$ =5.60) made their attributional judgments with greater ccnfidence than did Distracted subjects ($\underline{M}$ =3.40).

Discussion

The results obtained in the second study indicated that despite the apparent success of the status manipulation, the actor's status did not differentially influence the subjects' explanation-seeking. Nevertheless, the actor's status did influence subjects' causal attributions through its interaction with the amount of distraction they experienced in the situation. Contrary to expectations, non-distracted subjects attributed the high compared with the equal status actor's behavior more to his dispositions whereas there was little difference in attributions due to status when observers were distracted.

Focusing on the first half of the latter interaction, it had been anticipated that under non-distraction conditions, the high status person would be perceived more favorably than the lower status person and that this would cause the observers to perceive an inconsistency between the former's qualities and the nature of the act, giving rise to more search and a more situational attribution. This assumption was not upheld. Rather, the lack of difference in explanation-seeking due to status together with the attribution finding suggests that the action by the high status person was seen to be no more inconsistent with his nature than was the same action by the equal status person.

The results appear to be in accord with the view that observers attribute a high status person's actions under no distraction to his dispositions as a result of the observers' recognition that a high compared with a low status person has the power to resist situational influences if he so desires. Support for this interpretation is provided by the manipulation check data which indicated that although subjects recognised the difference in status between the high and equal status actor, the former was seen to be no more likeable or favorable than the latter. These latter findings indicate that the obtained status effect on attributions is actually due to a perceived difference in status or power rather than to the high and equal status persons' differing favorability. Although the latter suggestion was largely discounted in Thibaut and Riecken's (1955) study, it was not checked in Manes and Fitzgerald's (Note 1) study and might consequently account for their finding that a high status person's omission of a positive act was attributed to situational causes while his positive act was attributed to dispositional causes.

The second study also yielded findings which are consistent with the proposition that concurrent tasks or items which require simultaneous processing serve to reduce the amount of search undertaken by an observer. Thus, the subjects' explanation-seeking in the present study was differentially influenced by the presence or absence of a distracting task. Non-distracted subjects reported that they searched more for an explanation of the observed

counter-normative behavior than did distracted subjects. In addition, non-distracted subjects remembered more of the actor's discrete movements following the argument sequence than did the distracted subjects.

However, although non-distracted subjects searched more for an explanation than did distracted subjects as was predicted, the anticipated effect of distraction on causal attributions was not obtained. That is, it had been expected that the actor's behavior would be attributed to dispositional causes under both distraction and non-distraction conditions, but that the reduced search under distraction ccnditions would result in a more dispositional attribution than that made under non-distraction conditions. In contrast, it was found that while the actor's behavior was attributed to largely dispositional causes regardless of distraction, non-distracted subject's attributions were significantly more dispositional than were those of distracted subjects. This finding, however, was qualified by the significant status x distraction effect on attributions which was obtained. Whereas distraction exerted little differential influence on observers' attributions of an equal status actor's behavior, observers' attributions of a high status person's behavior were significantly more dispositional under non-distraction compared with distraction conditions. Although observer's impressions of the actor were generally more favorable under distraction compared with non-distraction conditions, it might be speculated that the distraction effect on causal

attributions of acts of high status people is more indicative of a state of caution in observers; a state which is engendered by the observers' recognition of the high status person's power and which increases the observers' need to be accurate in their judgments. Consistent with this suggestion is the finding that distracted observers were generally less confident in their causal attributions than were non-distracted subjects.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The rationale underlying the present project was that there was a need for attribution approaches (e.g., Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967, 1973) to focus some attention on specifying the conditions which influence an observer's search for an explanation of another's behavior. The present results indicate that such considerations as the normativeness of the actor's behavior, the observer's liking for the actor, and the interference from other situational factors experienced by the observer, do influence an observer's explanation-seeking. These findings have a number of implications for attribution theory. First, although more research is needed to specify the conditions which instigate explanation-seeking, the present findings, together with those of Newtson (1973), suggest that the attribution process is instigated at least by observed behaviors which violate the observers' expectations about the behaviors which are typically associated with individuals and with situations.

Secondly, contrary to the view implicit in Jones and Nisbett's (1971) conception of the attribution process, it is apparent that causal attributions are not reached quickly and easily by simply matching the observed behavior to a disposition and to a degree ignoring situational considerations. Instead, it is clear that some situations generate more explanation-seeking than others as a result of such additional considerations as the liking relationship

between the actor and the observer and the amount of cognitive interference experienced by the observer. Moreover, whether or not an observer proceeds through a series of steps to reach his causal attribution (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965), the present results confirm previous findings (Regan, Strauss & Fazio, 1973; Thibaut & Riecken, 1955) that, at least at the last stage, the observed behavior may be attributed to causes other than merely the actor's dispositions as a result of such relationship and situational considerations.

At the same time, however, it is to be noted that the impact of these relationship and situational factors on causal attributions has received scant attention in the current attribution approaches. The present results emphasise the need for attribution theories to account for their influence and for more research to be directed toward examining the effects on causal attributions of other potentially influential situational considerations such as factors which increase the importance of making an accurate attribution. Such factors might include situations in which the perceiver is required to interact with the other person on a task whose outcome is important to him.

It is also noteworthy that despite the influence of the relationship and situational factors on explanation-seeking and causal attributions, the findings obtained in the two studies indicate that there is no consistent relationship between the amount of search undertaken and the type of

causal attribution which is made. That is, dispositional attributions were not consistently based on more or less search than were situational attributions. In the first study, for example, observers searched less for an explanation of a disliked compared with a liked person's action and attributed the former's act more to dispositional causes than the latter's. In contrast, the data obtained in the second study indicated that observers who had undertaken more rather than less search as a result of the amount of distraction experienced, attributed the actor's behavior more to dispositional rather than situational causes. In view of these findings, it appears that regardless of the amount of search undertaken, observers' attributions are uniquely influenced by a variety of specific factors which, to date, includes their liking for the actor, his status, and the nature of the observed behavior and judgment situation.

The obtained pattern of findings also provides scant support for Newtson's (1973) suggestion that the confidence with which observers make their causal attributions is directly related to the amount of explanation-seeking undertaken. For example, although subjects searched more for an explanation of the liked compared with the disliked person's behavior, the subjects were more confident in their attribution of the latter's rather than the former's behavior. Instead, the present findings suggest that confidence is inversely related to the ambiguity or inconsistency of the information concerning the act and the

actor, with which the observer is confronted. The greater the variance in the potential causes, the lower the confidence that any one was the sufficient cause. According to this view, the difference in confidence due to liking, for example, would be a reflection of the greater ambiguity inherent in a liked rather than a disliked person committing a negative act. This suggestion assumes, of course, that the observer is not prevented by conflicting tasks or demands from pursuing an explanation to his satisfaction. If the observer's processing is interfered with in this way, it is to be expected that his explanation would be reached with reduced confidence. Thus, in the second study, it was found that the distracted compared with the non-distracted observers searched less for an explanation of the actor's behavior and were also less confident in the attributions they made. It is also noteworthy that the issue of the confidence with which observers make causal attributions, has potentially important implications for theoretical positions which stress the influence exerted by a person's attributions on his subsequent behavior. Specifically, it is possible that, rather than a person acting in response to his attribution of another's behavior, a person's response may depend upon both the nature of the attribution and the confidence with which that attribution is made. The recipient of attack may attribute the attacker's behavior to his dispositions but may only retaliate when he is absolutely certain of this attribution.

Finally, the lack of equivalent findings on the

explanation-seeking measures used in the two studies necessitates some comment. Although the self-report measure of amount of search was apparently sensitive in both studies, the recall measure was only sensitive in the second study while the additional film measure used in the first study also failed to register any significant effects. Assuming that the self-report measure provided a reasonably valid assessment of subjects' explanation-seeking, at least two explanations may be offered to account separately for the relative insensitivity of the other two measures. First, the recall measure was employed on the basis of Newtson's (1973) suggestion that unexpected behavior should increase observers' focusing of attention on the actor's subsequent behavior. Accordingly, it was assumed that if observers increased their attentiveness to the actor's behavior, they might be expected to recall more of the observed behavior. However, the lack of effects on this measure in the first study, together with only a distraction effect in the second study, suggests that this line of reasoning may be invalid. Instead, it is suggested that, rather than unexpected behavior increasing subsequent focusing by observers, it is possible that they may reduce their focusing, or at least simply monitor the ongoing behavior, while they think about the cause of the unexpected behavior. According to this view, no effects due to such factors as normativeness, liking or status would be expected on this measure, as was the case in the two studies. In contrast, a distraction effect as was obtained in the second

study would be expected on the recall measure because the observer's monitoring of the ongoing behavior would be subjected to continued interference.

Secondly, the additional film measure was employed in the first study on the assumption that subjects' amount of explanation-seeking would be directly reflected in the proportion of the remaining film they wished to see in order to bring some closure to their judgments. However, the lack of effects on this measure may be understood when considered in relation to studies (e.g., Lepper, Zanna & Abelson, 1970; Kanouse & Gross, Note 2) which have obtained findings suggesting that, once subjects have made an attribution, they are relatively unresponsive to new information. The additional film measure used in the present study actually constituted a situation in which subjects were offered more information after they had made their attributions. Thus, rather than being an indicator of insensitivity, the lack of effects on the additional film measure might be seen to be consistent with Kanouse's (1971,p.11) suggestion that, "individuals may be primarily motivated to seek a single sufficient or satisfactory explanation for any given event, rather than one that is the best of all possible explanations".

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Appendix 1

Instructions for Experiment 1

"This experiment is one of a series we're doing on the effects of different media (e.g., radio, TV., printed material) on the impressions people form. In this particular experiment, our interest is in the effects of TV on people's impressions. Briefly, we show people a number of films except that half the people see the films with sound whereas the other half see the films without sound. In this way we can compare the impressions formed and see the differences due to the presence and absence of sound. In addition, I'll get you firstly to fill in a standard attitude scale which we give to all subjects - it just gives us some more information. For example, we can correlate your attitudes with the impressions you form.

So, I'm going to show you 3 brief films, the first two of which are practice films so you can get used to the impression formation task. The first film that you'll see is one that I made using 2 graduate students. Briefly, what you'll see in this film is one of the graduate students doing some actions before he is joined by the second graduate student. The two then interact casually for about 3 minutes. In contrast, the other two films are films made of real experiments which were conducted in this department.

O.K., so you'll watch the graduate student film first, and in your case, you'll see the films without any sound. All you have to do then is to sit back and relax and watch the films as if you were watching an ordinary TV program only you won't hear any sound. However, before watching the films I'll get you to complete the attitude scale".

The subject then completed the attitude scale, watched the first practice film, and completed the first impression scale. The E then said,

"This first questionnaire then should give you some idea as to the impressions we're interested in. Any questions? O.K., so we'll do the same for the next two films - you watch them and then record your general impressions.

Now, just to give you some background on the next film - this is a film of an experiment which was run in this department and it was one of a series done on competitive behavior. In this experiment, two subjects faced each other at a table and were given a diagram of a model which they had to construct between them. The model was a ship and they had to construct it in 5 minutes. Now, what makes this experiment interesting is that the task was competitive in that the most successful person was the one who contributed most to the completion of the model. Any questions?"

The E then walked to the monitor and, before turning it on said, "Actually, you might find this film somewhat interesting - I just compared your scores on the attitude scale with those of the 2 guys who took part in the competition experiment, and you are very similar (Like condition) or different (Dislike condition) to one of the guys. You know, your attitudes on sport and politics and so on are almost identical (are almost directly opposite). You two would probably get on very well together (not get on very well together at all)".

The E then turned the monitor on and identified the similar (different) person to the subject. After a pause and just when the competitors started the task, the E said, "We'll just have a look at the first couple of minutes of this film before going on to the main film". In the Normative condition, the E added that, "Actually, this task was apparently quite arousing and tended to bring out the competitiveness in the subjects who participated. You'll see an example of this in this particular film. This guy here (indicates similar or dissimilar participant) gets pretty competitive and grabs a stick from the other guy and they have an argument - it happens at around the 2 minute mark".

The subject then watched the film which was turned off 20 seconds after the argument, and completed the main questionnaire. The E then said, "There are about another 3 minutes of this film remaining, how many more minutes of film would you want to see to become fully assured in your judgement of the cause of the similar (different) person's argumentative behavior?" After recording this number, the E indicated that the subject was not going to be shown a third film and that the experiment was concluded.

APPENDIX 2

GENERAL ATTITUDE SCALE

AGE: _____

SEX: _____

Department of Psychology

GENERAL ATTITUDE SCALE

NOTE: There are NO right or wrong answers.

1. a) Rate your general interest in politics and elections:

EXTREMELY INTERESTED / / / / / / / / EXTREMELY UNINTERESTED

b) Rate the likelihodd that you would campaign actively for a political candidate of your choice:

VERY LIKELY TO CAMPAIGN / / / / / / / / VERY UNLIKELY TO CAMPAIGN

c) Indicate how much you think you would be influenced by the views of a particular candidate or a party platform in casting your vote:

MOST INFLUENCED BY CANDIDATE / / / / / / / / MOST INFLUENCED BY ISSUES

d) Rate how much you feel that a political candidate should reveal his sources of income:

SHOULD REVEAL COMPLETELY / / / / / / / / SHOULD NOT REVEAL AT ALL

2. a) Rate your personal participation in winter sports (e.g., skiing, skating, curling, etc.):

GREAT DEAL OF PARTICIPATION / / / / / / / / DO NOT PARTICIPATE AT ALL

b) Rate your personal participation in summer sports (e.g., tennis, swimming, hiking, canoeing, etc.):

GREAT DEAL OF PARTICIPATION / / / / / / / / DO NOT PARTICIPATE AT ALL

c) Rate the probability that you read the sport pages first when you read a newspaper:

HIGHLY PROBABLE / / / / / / / / HIGHLY IMPROBABLE

c) Indicate how much you feel that people should take part in physical recreation:

FEEL STRONGLY THAT PEOPLE SHOULD PARTICIPATE / / / / / / / / DO NOT FEEL STRONGLY AT ALL THAT PEOPLE SHOULD PARTICIPATE

3. a) Indicate how strongly you feel that the government should be more concerned with protecting the environment:

FEEL VERY STRONGLY / / / / / / / DO NOT FEEL STRONGLY AT ALL

b) Rate how much you feel that the environment should be protected from commercial interests:

SHOULD BE PROTECTED / / / / / / / SHOULD NOT BE PROTECTED

c) Rate the likelihood that you would do something actively (e.g., march in a protest parade, write a letter to the newspaper, etc.) in support of your view:

EXTREMELY LIKELY TO ACTIVELY SUPPORT / / / / / / / EXTREMELY UNLIKELY TO ACTIVELY SUPPORT

4. a) Indicate whether you feel that the university courses should be oriented to solving society's problems or to the pursuit of knowledge:

SHOULD BE ORIENTED TO SOCIETY'S PROBLEMS / / / / / / / SHOULD BE ORIENTED TO PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE

b) Indicate how mucy of a say students should have in the selection of course content:

SHOULD HAVE A LARGE SAY / / / / / / / SHOULD HAVE NO SAY AT ALL

c) Indicate how much of a say students should have in general university administration:

SHOULD HAVE A LARGE SAY / / / / / / / SHOULD HAVE NO SAY AT ALL

d) Rate how strongly you feel that courses should be graded or passed or failed:

FEEL STRONGLY SHOULD BE GRADED / / / / / / / FEEL STRONGLY SHOULD BE PASS-FAIL

5. a) Rate how much you enjoy the company of other people(s):

ENJOY VERY MUCH / / / / / / / DO NOT ENJOY AT ALL

b) Indicate how much you prefer 1 or 2 close friendships or a number of acquaintances:

STRONGLY PREFER FEW CLOSE FRIENDSHIPS	/ / / / / / / /	STRONGLY PREFER A NUMBER OF ACQUAINTANCES

c) Rate how easily you adapt to new social situations:

ADAPT VERY EASILY	/ / / / / / / /	DO NOT ADAPT AT ALL

APPENDIX 3

INTERACTION QUESTIONNAIRE

AGE: _____

SEX: _____

Interaction Questionnaire

1. Describe on the following attributes the general atmosphere in this interaction, as you saw it.

TENSE	/ / / / / / / /	CALM
SAD	/ / / / / / / /	HAPPY
DULL	/ / / / / / / /	EXCITING
HUMOROUS	/ / / / / / / /	HUMORLESS
BORING	/ / / / / / / /	ENTERTAINING
THREATENING	/ / / / / / / /	NON-THREATENING
CONFUSING	/ / / / / / / /	CLEARCUT
IRRITATING	/ / / / / / / /	RELAXING
WARM	/ / / / / / / /	COLD

APPENDIX 4

MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EXPERIMENT 1

AGE: _____

SEX: _____

T.V. Questionnaire 2

1. Discribe on the following attributes the general atmosphere in this situation, as you saw it.

FLUID	/ / / / / / / /	STATIC
TENSE	/ / / / / / / /	CALM
PESSIMISTIC	/ / / / / / / /	OPTIMISTIC
DULL	/ / / / / / / /	EXCITING
THREATENING	/ / / / / / / /	NON-THREATENING
CONTROLLED	/ / / / / / / /	UNCONTROLLED
HUMOROUS	/ / / / / / / /	HUMORLESS
IRRITATING	/ / / / / / / /	RELAXING
WARM	/ / / / / / / /	COLD

2. Give your impression of Person "A" on the following attributes:

RELIABLE	/ / / / / / / /	UNRELIABLE
WAVERING	/ / / / / / / /	PERSISTENT
HONEST	/ / / / / / / /	DISHONEST
LIKEABLE	/ / / / / / / /	UNLIKEABLE
IRRITABLE	/ / / / / / / /	GOOD-NATURED
HUMOROUS	/ / / / / / / /	HUMORLESS
TOLERANT	/ / / / / / / /	FINICKY

3. a) As you watched the film, how unexpected to you was the argument between Person A and Person B?

VERY UNEXPECTED /___/___/___/___/___/___/___/___/ NOT UNEXPECTED AT ALL

b) To what extent did you find yourself searching for an explanation for Person A's argumentative behavior, while you were watching the film?

NO SEARCH AT ALL /___/___/___/___/___/___/___/___/ GREAT DEAL OF SEARCH

4. a) Indicate how much the argument between Person A and Person B was caused by A's own characteristics (i.e., his personality traits or dispositions) or the characteristics of the situation (i.e., the competitive nature of the task or B's behavior):

A's OWN CHARACTERISTICS /___/___/___/___/___/___/___/___/ CHARACTERISTICS OF SITUATION

b) Indicate how confident you feel in making this judgment:

VERY CONFIDENT /___/___/___/___/___/___/___/___/ NOT AT ALL CONFIDENT

c) If you were not absolutely certain of the cause of Person A's behavior, indicate how much information you would need in order to feel more certain in your judgment:

GREAT DEAL OF INFORMATION /___/___/___/___/___/___/___/___/ NO INFORMATION AT ALL

5. In the argument sequence, Person A first takes a stick from Person B then speaks heatedly to Person B with the stick in his hand. Try to list the next 3 specific movements (i.e., with hands, head, etc.) made by Person A:

(1) _____

(2) _____

(3) _____

6. To what extent do you feel yourself tobe similar to Person A?

VERY SIMILAR /___/___/___/___/___/___/___/___/ NOT AT ALL SIMILAR

7. Rate Person "B" on the following attributes:

RELIABLE	/___/___/___/___/___/___/___/	UNRELIABLE
WAVERING	/___/___/___/___/___/___/___/	PERSISTENT
HONEST	/___/___/___/___/___/___/___/	DISHONEST
LIKEABLE	/___/___/___/___/___/___/___/	UNLIKEABLE
IRRITABLE	/___/___/___/___/___/___/___/	GOOD-NATURED
HUMOROUS	/___/___/___/___/___/___/___/	HUMORLESS
TOLERANT	/___/___/___/___/___/___/___/	FINICKY

8. Based on the behavior you observed, indicate which between Person A and B you think would have won the contest?

☐ PERSON A

☐ PERSON B

APPENDIX 5

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

OF SCORES ON SIMILARITY ITEM

Source	df	SS	MS	F	p
A: Normativeness	1	.40	.40	0.20	
B: Liking	1	19.59	19.59	9.99	<.01
A x B	1	2.50	2.50	1.27	
Error	36	70.59	1.96		

APPENDIX 6

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

OF SCORES ON LIKEABITY ITEM

Source	df	SS	MS	F	p
A: Normativeness	1	2.02	2.02	1.65	
B: Liking	1	13.22	13.22	10.80	<.01
A x B	1	.62	.62	.51	
Error	36	44.09	1.22		

APPENDIX 7

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

OF SUMMED SCORES ON FAVORABILITY ITEMS

Source	df	SS	MS	F	p
A: Normativeness	1	9.02	9.02	.43	
B: Liking	1	133.22	133.22	6.49	<.05
A x B	1	3.02	3.02	.14	
Error	36	738.69	20.51		

APPENDIX 8

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

OF SCORES ON UNEXPECTEDNESS ITEM

Source	df	SS	MS	F	p
A: Normativeness	1	129.60	129.60	61.55	<.01
B: Liking	1	.90	.90	.42	
A x B	1	.10	.10	.04	
Error	36	75.79	2.10		

APPENDIX 9

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

OF SCORES ON EXPLANATION-SEEKING ITEM

Source	df	SS	MS	F	p
A: Normativeness	1	4.90	4.90	1.54	
B: Liking	1	14.40	14.40	4.54	<.05
A x B	1	16.89	16.89	5.33	<.05
Error	36	114.19	3.17		

APPENDIX 10

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

OF SCORES ON CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION ITEM

Source	df	SS	MS	F	p
A: Normativeness	1	1.59	1.59	1.14	
B: Liking	1	19.59	19.59	14.05	<.01
A x B	1	2.50	2.50	1.79	
Error	36	50.19	1.39		

APPENDIX 11

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

OF SCORES ON CONFIDENCE ITEM

Source	df	SS	MS	F	p
A: Normativeness	1	1.22	1.22	0.52	
B: Liking	1	11.02	11.02	4.76	<.05
A x B	1	13.22	13.22	5.71	<.05
Error	36	83.29	2.31		

Appendix 12

Instructions for Experiment 2

"This experiment is one of a series we're doing on the effects of different media (e.g., radio, TV, printed material) on the impressions people form. In this particular experiment, our interest is in the effects of TV on people's impressions. Briefly, we show people a number of films except that half the people see the films with sound whereas the other half see the films without sound. In this way we can compare the impressions formed and see the differences due to the presence and absence of sound.

So, I'm going to show you 3 brief films, the first two of which are practice films so you can get used to the impression formation task. The first film that you'll see is one that I made using two graduate students. Briefly, what you'll see in this film is one of the graduate students doing some actions before he is joined by the second graduate student. The two then interact casually for about 3 minutes. In contrast, the other two films are films made of real experiments which were conducted in this department.

O.K., so you'll watch the graduate student film first, and in your case, you'll see the films without any sound. All you have to do then is to sit back and relax and watch the films as if you were watching an ordinary TV program only you won't hear any sound". The subject then watched the first practice film and completed the first impression scale. The E then said,

"This first questionnaire then should give you some idea as to the impressions we're interested in. Any questions? O.K., so we'll do the same for the next two films - you watch them and then record your general impressions.

Now, just to give you some background on the next film - this is a film of an experiment which was run in this department and it was one of a series done on competitive behavior. In this experiment, two subjects like yourself (paricipants) faced each other at a table and were given a diagram of a of a model which they had to construct between them. The model was a ship and they had to construct it in 5 minutes. Now, what makes this task interesting is that the task was competitive in that the most successfu lperson was the one who contributed most to the completion of the model". For subjects in the High status condition, the E added, "And that in this experiment, a professor competed with a student to construct the model. The professor is on the faculty of this department - you might have seen him - and the student was taking undergraduate courses at the time the experiment was run".

To subjects in the Distraction condition, the E then said, "Now you're going to have one additional task to do while you're watching the film. Do you see this red light here? Right, well it's going to be flashing on and off while the film is running. Most of the time it will be giving short duration flashes. However, every now and then, in random order, the light will give longer duration flashes. Every time the duration changes like this, I want you to say, 'change'. The reason we're doing this is that we want to see what impressions people form under distraction conditions. So the task is meant to be roughly analogous to, for example, a person watching TV and reading a newspaper at the same time - in effect, the person has to process two pieces of information at the same time. Any questions? O.K., I'll show you the difference between long and short flashes". The E then demonstrated the long and short duration illuminations of the light, and the subject was given some practice at differentiating them.

The E then turned on the monitor and identified the professor to subjects in the High status condition. After a pause and just when the competitors had started the task, the E said, "We'll just have a look at the first couple of minutes of this film before going on to the main film". The subject then watched the film which was turned off 20 seconds after the argument, and completed the main questionnaire. The E then indicated that the subject was not going to be shown a third film and that the experiment was concluded.

APPENDIX 13

MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EXPERIMENT 2

AGE: _____

SEX: _____

T.V. Questionnaire 2

1. Describe on the following attributes the general atmosphere in this situation.

FLUID	/ / / / / / / /	STATIC
TENSE	/ / / / / / / /	CALM
PESSIMISTIC	/ / / / / / / /	OPTIMISTIC
DULL	/ / / / / / / /	EXCITING
THREATENING	/ / / / / / / /	NON-THREATENING
CONTROLLED	/ / / / / / / /	UNCONTROLLED
HUMOROUS	/ / / / / / / /	HUMORLESS
IRRITATING	/ / / / / / / /	RELAXING
WARM	/ / / / / / / /	COLD

2. Give your immediate impression of Person "A" on the following attributes:

RELIABLE	/ / / / / / / /	UNRELIABLE
INTELLIGENT	/ / / / / / / /	UNINTELLIGENT
WAVERING	/ / / / / / / /	PERSISTENT
HONEST	/ / / / / / / /	DISHONEST
LIKEABLE	/ / / / / / / /	UNLIKEABLE
IRRITABLE	/ / / / / / / /	GOOD-NATURED
KNOWLEDGEABLE	/ / / / / / / /	UNKNOWLEDGEABLE
UNTRUSTWORTHY	/ / / / / / / /	TRUSTWORTHY
HUMOROUS	/ / / / / / / /	HUMORLESS
TOLERANT	/ / / / / / / /	FINICKY

3. a) Rate how much the argument between Person "A" and Person "B" was caused by A's own characteristics (i.e., personality traits or dispositions) or the characteristics of the situation (i.e., the competitive nature of the task or "B's" behavior).

A's OWN CHARACTERISTICS / / / / / / / / CHARACTERISTICS OF SITUATION

b) Indicate how confident you feel in making the above judgment:

EXTREMELY CONFIDENT / / / / / / / / NOT AT ALL CONFIDENT

4. To what extent did you find yourself searching for an explanation for Person "A's" argumentative behaviour, while you were watching the film?

GREAT DEAL OF SEARCH / / / / / / / / NO SEARCH AT ALL

5. In the argument sequence, Person "A" first takes a stick from Person "B" then speaks heatedly to Person B with the stick in his hadn. Try to list the next 3 specific movements (i.e., with hands, head, etc.) made by Person A.

(1) _____

(2) _____"

(3) _____

6. Rate Person "B" on the following attributions:

RELIABLE / / / / / / / / UNRELIABLE

INTELLIGENT / / / / / / / / UNINTELLIGENT

WAVERING / / / / / / / / PERSISTENT

HONEST / / / / / / / / DISHONEST

LIKEABLE / / / / / / / / UNLIKEABLE

IRRITABLE / / / / / / / / GOOD-NATURED

KNOWLEDGEABLE / / / / / / / / UNKNOWLEDGEABLE

UNTRUSTWORTHY / / / / / / / / TRUSTWORTHY

HUMOROUS / / / / / / / / HUMORLESS

TOLERANT / / / / / / / / FINICKY

7. Based on the behavior you observed, indicate which between Person "A" and "B" you think would have won the contest?

☐ PERSON A

☐ PERSON B

8. To what extent were you distracted from observing this film by the 'changing light' task?

VERY DISTRACTED / / / / / / / / NOT DISTRACTED AT ALL

APPENDIX 14

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

OF SUMMED SCORES ON STATUS ITEMS

Source	df	SS	MS	F	p
A: Distraction	1	15.62	15.62	2.55	
B: Status	1	46.22	46.22	7.57	<.01
A x B	1	1.22	1.22	0.20	
Error	36	219.89	6.10		

APPENDIX 15

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

OF SCORES ON LIKEABILITY ITEM

Source	df	SS	MS	F	p
A: Distraction	1	36.09	36.09	23.04	<.01
B: Status	1	.90	.90	0.57	
A x B	1	2.50	2.50	1.59	
Error	36	56.39	1.56		

APPENDIX 16

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

OF SCORES ON FAVORABILITY ITEMS

Source	df	SS	MS	F	p
A: Distraction	1	555.02	555.02	17.79	<.01
B: Status	1	1.22	1.22	.03	
A x B	1	1.22	1.22	.03	
Error	36	1123.29	1123.29		

APPENDIX 17

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

OF SCORES ON EXPLANATION-SEEKING ITEM

Source	df	SS	MS	F	p
A: Distraction	1	36.09	36.09	17.61	<.01
B: Status	1	4.90	4.90	2.39	
A x B	1	1.60	1.60	.78	
Error	36	73.79	2.04		

APPENDIX 18

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

OF SCORES ON RECALL ITEM

Source	df	SS	MS	F	p
A: Distraction	1	4.90	4.90	10.14	<.01
B: Status	1	.40	.40	.82	
A x B	1	.40	.40	.82	
Error	36	17.39	.48		

APPENDIX 19

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

OF SCORES ON CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION ITEM

Source	df	SS	MS	F	p
A: Distraction	1	25.59	25.59	12.35	<.01
B: Status	1	4.90	4.90	2.36	
A x B	1	10.00	10.00	4.82	<.05
Error	36	74.59	2.07		

APPENDIX 20

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

OF SCORES ON CONFIDENCE ITEM

Source	df	SS	MS	F	p
A: Distraction	1	48.39	48.39	22.75	<.01
B: Status	1	.90	.90	.42	
A x B	1	.10	.10	.04	
Error	36	76.59	2.12		